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,1. nOVES, HAWKS AND OWLS 
During the last decennium we noticed in many' European countries two 
trendswhich cause serious concern. The first trend Is an increased sensibi-
lisation of: 'ihe public opinion for security and defense' issues - a sensibili-
sation which' has not been a'ccompanied by an equal' increase in the leveI 
of information and analytic skills. In my own country, people were asked 
whatpercentage of the gross-national product BeIgium spends on' defense. 
Half did not :know; and the majority of the interviewe'es who c1aimed to 
know exagerated considerabIy; nearly a quarter thought that 23 % or m.ore 
of the GNP was spent in defense. In fact we spend less than 3 % (1). People 
unencumbered with a knowledge of facts are easy prey for internai and 
externaI demagogues. The second trend is a deteriorating consensus of defense 
policies; in many European countries the discussion has become more pola-
rised. Many factors have ,contributed to those trends. A major responsibility 
however couId be, attrihuted to the so called «hawks» and «doves». When 
one analyzes the approaches of those two groups, one is surprised, by the 
fact that between them there are more similarities than· differences. In fact 
the onIy great difference is that both c1aim to strive towards peace. Let me 
however highlight three similarities. The first is that both hawks and doves 
have a tendency to simplify reality. This is illustrated in their pref~rence 
for worst-case anaIyses. ExampIes of such anaIyses are e.g. General Close's. 
book «Europe sans défense» in which a scenario was depicted that ~VI~~Jd" , 
aIlow the Soviets in 48 hours to the Rhine. Many nuclear winter' sceÍuirios 
made 'by doves are typicaI worst-case products. Talking to 'suc~, ~~ople"for 
(1) Luc Reychler, Belgische defensie in de peiling, in Cahiers van het Centrum voor 
Vredesonderzoek, m. 11, May 1985. ' 
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an hour, makesyou sometimes feeI sixty minutes c10ser t(), your <.1ead. 
The probIem with worst-case analysis is that they are not very probable, and 
tend to distract the attentíon f tom more realistic' scenarios. Hawks and doves 
have not only a preference for worst-case analyses, but aIs o suffer of 
what could be called reductionism. This is a tendency to focus a11 the 
attentíon on e.g. one cause 'of the armsescalation process and overlooking' 
others. For some the cause is the lack of peace-education; for some it's 
the existence of militaristic thínking, for others it is the existence of 
structural violence or military imbalance. ~ thorough knowled~e of inter-
national relations shows that armsescalations and wars are multi-causal feno-
mena, which could only be threated effectively. when one copes with alI 
tl.1e major causes at the same time. Hawks and doves should' paf~doxical1y 
as it, sounds m~e not to much abstraction of ,tI:te complex reality. 
A second similarity b~tween hawks and doves is their intolerance for 
other . points of. view. Both groups ,are characterised by taboes, strong con-
formity pressures and the use of. passwords. For the hawks the password 
is NATO: to be for NATO means to be for security; an anti-NATO, 
attítude is considered' a security-risck. For doves to be against the cruise·, 
-roissiles is considered to be for peace;' to .be for the installation, is considered 
to be against peace. Such a conformity pressure leaves practically' no space 
for an open discussion. Missileshave' become symbols and joined the c1ass 
of taboes. Both groups tend to be c1ose-minded.When one checks their 
reading lists or citations one finds the saroe names over and over. Hawks, 
cite conservative strategists, and doves bona fidepeace' researchers. Both 
groups functión as, closed systems, or systems who'ate' 8rify opeh for positive . 
and, ·clo~ed .' fór 'nega tive feedback. Reinforcing such behavior are their' 
mirTor-imagef of each other. Doves consider themselves more moral, 
re~li~Üc, 'responsible than hawks, and vice versa. 
'Th~' íhird similarity between hawks and doves is their fdnaiici~11'Z; and 
ab~~iúté' lack' 01 a' sense of' humor. Personally I believe that the · reaiity" , 
ot international c~~flicts is serious enough, to not ,loose its sense of humor. 
A 10ss of hum~r limits ones power t'o ,think.Hu~or is a good way to 
remove arrogance which stifles thinking. It's also á good cure against 
cynicism, defaitism, fanatism and. alI ,kinds of doomthinking. The ~loser 
we approach the 21st cêritury,- the greatet t' think will be the neecl.'Jq.· 
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recrea'te th:e function of' :Courtjesters, or what Sufis' called (nvise .. fools)} who 
had an eye and feeliÍ'lg 'for the manycontractions· and paradoxes inreality. 
This somewhat· caricature comparison of the thinking {)f ·hawks and 
doves, which sltuatê(themselves at the two extremes of the security discussion 
in many European countries, was meant to contrast their way of thinking 
with thinking of the owl or the scientific' a.pptoach. The owl's approach 
is the opposite of both the hawk - and dove - approaches. Instead of simpli-
fying reality, one studies it thoroughly; instead of looking at reality from one 
point of view," one looks at it from many points of view, and instead·of 
lackinghumo~, one cultivates it. 
2.DIÂONOSES AND CURES 
< The scientist could considerably enrich the discussion about international 
conflict and conflict-management thrQugh·his diagnoses. Although diagnoses 
aré not cures, they are preconditions for designing cures. Let us look at three 
kindsof diagnoses. First descriptive diagnoses. Here the analyst strives towards 
ali accurate and uncompromising descriptiol1 of reality. Any over or underesti-
matidn of reality enhances the risksand costs of a policy. According: to 
one estimate nearIy 3/5 of war .initiations since 1910 have,been bas.ed 
onerróts"rif perception, judgment and expectation of outconle (2). An overes-
timation of threats enhances expensivearmsescalations; an underestimation 
unpreparedness. In order to improve the' information content of the public 
discussion scientists frequent1y have to assume the role of iconoclasts. Its 
their duty to debuct the myths and dogmas of hawks and doves. Whenever 
proponents of a theory resist new facts, while attacking alI alterna tive 
explanations as heresies, that theory turns in a dogma. At that point, the 
proponents often try to buttres their case by distorting facts and history (~):" . 
Let. uslookat some of those dogmas. A first dogma is the action-reaction 
model~: frequently 'used for explaining the armsescalation processo For the 
hawks1, the reacting party are the Americans, for the doves the Soviets. 
An historical analysis however shows that both at different points in time 
have been actors and reactors. In addiÜo.n to that one cannot conc1ude 
f)'Francis Beer, Peace agail1sf ll'ur, 1981, W. H.' 'Freeman & Company. San Francisco, 
p. 15. . 
(') Fred l~lé, N~clear Stralegy: Can there be a happy ~nding"! in Foreigll ,1ffelirs, 
Spring 1985. 1 
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from the,:fact that someone frequently ends secoild'dn a race, that he/she 
does' nót ·strive to be second to none. A second dogma 'CQncerns the called 
tmemy-and .. friend .. images. For the hawks the·enemy. is. Jbe .Soviet7Union. 
Doveson the other hand in order to evade the n.efarious consequences oI 
enemy-images frequently have the propensity to overlO()~ the negative aspects 
of the Soviet Union and .highlight the positive ones. For a scientist however, 
both the application. of· ftien,d - and: enemy -:- images can. provide nega tive 
consequences; especiaUy:when the respective images deviate from reality. The 
third .dogma.concems the so-called :~armement gaps»; e.g. the bombergap, 
the missile gap; the window of vulnerability,. etc. f:or; the l:tawks they 
were real gaps; for the doves they were imag~d gaps, tríeks' 'to -raise 
unneeessarily the defense expenditures. Although arms. presentations could 
be misused, one should not forget that there were also examples of urider-
-estimations. Some years ago the US mistakenly thought to have a five 
year lead- in MIR VEDmissiles. Co-responsible for those over - or under-
estimations were the imperfeet -intelligenee gathering and analysis systems of 
the US and the ·military propagandapoliey of the Soviet Union .. Chr.usthey's 
bombast language abouthis nuclear: arsenal has eonsiderably eontriputed 
to the temporary so ealled «missile ·gap»: .at -the beginning.of. the. sixties. 
The last dogma concetns· opinion':'polls ,and' referenda. Opinion -polls are 
very usefull because oI their, ,rore;:8s"'. communication channels between. the 
cÍtizens and the govemment. As instruments·. however to .- orient the future. 
policies of govemm'ent or as measures of .its -lhedem.ocratie content, they 
are c1early limited. They could- only be reeomm'endedoneondition that (1) 
the interviewees are ·allowed to express their opinion in a nuanced way;, 
(2) to the extent that .lhe opinion is an informed opinion. Some opinion-
polls are' like Procrustean beds;and· others provoke ideal type situations 
answers. 50 in arder to assess the value of opinion' poUs and referenda, 
one -'shouldnot only judge the' nature of - the questions, but a1so the 
information eontent on wmeh those opinions are based. :Proponents of 
referenda who neglect those requirements, are either gUlliblé'ordemagogues . 
of the worst sort.:· , " '}' -~, " 
Mter debunking some misrepiesentations of reality~' 'lef's '1<5ók 'át '! 
the fenomenon of violent confliet in the presentworld. ~ine~' theSecond 
World War we had a name for the next one: the Third. World War. 
However a ThirdWorld War never realize'd; what we had iristead were 
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many Third World, Wars., , Since, W.W.. II we noticed approximately 400, 
small and great violentconfli(;t.s -·'most ,are 10cated in the lhird world. 
Todayyou can ,ta~~ ,a"" plaqe and, qbserve one of approximately thirty 
violent conflicts; they vary~,.,fr~m conflicts vlich are relatively well con-
trQlled,as ~omentarely i~, :Í}1e Philippines, where some, 15000 armed 
guerillas are operating i.a up to 62 of the nation 73 provinces, to an 
Iran-Irak war wh.ich has, according to some estimates c1aimed approxima-
tely 1,5 million death. Most present conflicts are not inte.rnational conficts, 
but internationalized domestic confUcts. In contrast to tne Third WorId, 
the North~m 'part 'of the ~orId~oüld' be called a sanctuarium. Though 
heavily arme'd,' East ,and 'West h<;ls b$!en relatively free of violence. Some 
authors likb 'Matthew ,Melk.o ," expects' tlüs state of peace to continue, 
at least urttil tlie 'iIiiddle ofthe 21 st century. His prediction is based on 
the pêréepÚ'ón of cyc1es of peace and war in the Western W orId. After 
greàt wars like the 100 years war which ended in middle 15 th century; 
the 30 years war; the Napoleontic war, he noticed periods of peace 
which averaged from 100 to 150 years. After what he 'callsthe WorId Wars, 
including the first and 'Secon'd ,oWorldWar, he' expedí; a similar long 
period of peace (4). A1thc'i.igh i ':áttractiVe, it's alw~ysJ)r~denf to consider 
such predictions as hyPothêses;~ 'extrapolating th~ past ha.s alwaysbeen a 
risky business. Forecasts' based' on an insight in the' conditions which' 
enhance and inhibitviolent behavior are much more reIiable. 
To call the 20 'ih century the age of violence' as some other authors 
do in probably is,' somewhat exagerated. It is true that the first and 
second world wars were catastrophic ones; the first claimed 10 and the 
second 50 million lives, but there are examples of equalIy catastrophic 
wars, such as the Thirty years war from 1618-1648; with most of the 
action in central Europe. The 10ss of life during that war has been 
estimated to have been at least six million, , representing 40 per cent of the 
population of,central Europe at thattime; and as 'much as 65 per cent-
of. the totalpopulations of several' 'of,,' the:; ·embroiled states. Another' 
example of a calamitous war was the Chihese Rebellion' of 1850-1864. 
The so called Tai-Ping movement, was ultimately unsuccessful in its 
(') Matthew Me1ko, Peace in our Time, Wright State University (mantiscript to be 
published soon). 
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long drawn out, attempt to overthrow' theManchú 'dynasty. The final 
total number of war deaths on both sides- 'isestimaied to have been 
between twenty million and fortyinillión, represertting about seven per 
cent of China's total population af thetiine. "Despite the existence of 
equaIly catastrophic wars in previous centuries, there are however some 
trends which make it different from other tenturies. First of 'all, the 
fighting of wars has become more expensive: th:e average costs to kill 
a soldier has been estimated to be 30 dollars fór Napoleon, 2100 dollar 
during WWI, 50000 duringWWII; 200000 dütíng the Korean War (5). 
Another trend is the fact that wars have becomC more democratised at le~t 
in terms of their consequences. Irí WWI 5 % of the people killed are civiliaÍÍs; 
in wwn tbis number reached nearly 500/0; during the Korean and Vietnam 
war thé' percentage of civilians was raised to approximately 80 to 90 0/0. 
A third trend, is the greater lethality of lhe weapons involved. A United 
States colonel P. H. Dupuy created a let~a1ity index to evaluate different 
weapons; the longbow he gave a score of ;34 a oue megaton warhead 
a score of 18 billion (6). A more accurate description of our century, 
than the century of violence, would be the century of potencial annihilation. 
In some parts of the world the armsescalaÚo~ 'has made wars more 
destructive, in others it has been used to deter wars. Anyway the ongoing 
armsescalation' has not been very cost-effective; it has produced less or 
eufemistically stated equal security; it taps 10ts of emotional energy of 
the . citizens whose security is being provided by being hostages and it 
ah~orbs lots of intelIectual energy. N'early half a million 'engineers and 
intelleetuals are involved in the developJ!lent of new weapons. The threat 
of . greater violence and the high costs of. the present security system 
makes research about international conflict behavior more than relevant .. 
And this brings us to . the sccondkind of diagnosis which aims ' .ait 
getting a better insight into ;:the 'causes of conflicts, or,more precísely 
into the conditions which 'enhance the chances of constructive and inhibit 
the chances of destructive confliét' behavior. 
e> B. V. A. Rõling, Vredeswetenschap, 1981, Uitgcverij Het Spcctrum, Utrecht, p. 38. 
(') In Ralph M. Goldman, Armscontrolcm,d peacekeeping, 1982, Random House; Ncw York. 
p. 11. 
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3. PATHS TO VIOLENT CONFLICT:,' 
AlI' th~ conditions whi<::h have beeii.: stuilied wÍlli rcspccl to violellt 
conflicts,. could be divided into' three groups: the,' first group contains 
research 'aÍ)()Ut confiicts. Without confli~ts, wars are unt~inkable. A~ thorough 
analysÍs of confliCts 'li than ais o a cOilditiô' sine quan9n for an effective 
conflict-management .. The second group contains studiés about the oppor-
tunity structure ~ith which the decision~fuakers at6' confrortted. Here 
we look at the factors which allow or constrain the use of violénce'. 
The third group ~ontaihs research about dédsion~makingprocesses'.Wars 
áre no accidents; they ate made by men. They could be decisions based 
on the expection that the benefits wiH be higher than the costs' or an 
the perception that the use of violence was the onIy option left. 
.", . ~'; . . : 
" CONFLICT 
I OPP,ORTUNITY STRUCTURE VIOLENT CONFLICT 
, DECISION-MAKING 
". " Figure 1. Three clusters of variables inhibiting or enhancing violent conflicts. 
Let me focus at each cluster of variables more careful1ly. 
A. Conflicts 
, Symmétl-lc and asymmetric conflicts 
With respect to conflicts, I would like to highlight three points. 
First of alI, it is c1ear that the chances of war increase when ,the 
interests at state are raised. Interests can ,vary from perifery -, primary-, 
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vital- and survival interests. The more the latter are threatened' by an 
oppol1ent, the greater will be the propensity to use violenee to secure 
them. A relevant" distinction" to be made is that between symmetric 
'and asymmetric, 'conflicts. Symmetry couId be measured in terros 'Of the 
power of the conflicting partl~s,1:>ut also in terms 'of the interests at 
stake. The latter distinction is very important of one wants to prediet e.g. 
the outcome of war. One out of Íive international wars has been won 
by the weaker party. 
Research, data show that superior will tends', to be reIated to the 
interestsat sta~e; and that it occasionally may give the advantage to 
the weak:ê,r"party. 
Manisfest and latent conflicts 
The second point I would like to highlight is the distinction between 
manifest and latent conflicts. The world is full of latent conflicts; conficts 
that are now latent, but could explode later and drastically change the 
international scene. Iran is a case in point. For a Iong tim'e the Americans 
invested in the Shah, to develop his country as a stronghold of the Free 
World. A revolution was not predicted. Now it's a hotbed of fundamentalism 
and involved in one of the bloodiest wars going 011. There are many 
other countries which are walking a thightrope. The Philippines is one 
of them. If Marcos fails to provide reforms and a capable successor, 
, most analysts agree, the Philippines could tumble Í:1to a military dictatorship 
or a communist take over within five years. As former U. S. Ambassador 
William Sullivan puts it, it has suddenly become the most dangerous, 
llIl:~~ttling and destabilizing pr~blem an.y\.V~ere on the Pacific rim (1). To 
cope with conflicts effectively,one shQuld be able to descern latent 
conflicts and understand the conditions which enhance their actualization. 
Peace is not always the highest va/ue 
The last point I like to make with respect to ,col1flicts concerns 
the value of peace. The believe that alI nations strive towards peace 
(') The Philippines: another Iran?, in Newsweek, November 4, 1985. ' 
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is a dangerous illusion. At one point Hitler was quoted to say that peace 
was his greatest treasure. In his book In War Clausewitz writes that 
.' the aggression always pretends to be peàce loving because he would like 
to achieve his goals without bloodshed 'and that, therefore, aggressioh 
'must be presented as a defensive reactiO'n 'by the aggressive nation. Besides 
'an awareness of the use and rnisuse of the', term peace, one should 
, also know that although men desire peace, it is generally not their highest 
v~due. If it were, peace and peacefu~ change could easi1y 'be áchieved; 
a nation need only refuse to defend itself. Throughout history, however, 
people have placed Dther values and interests above their desire for peace. 
From this perspective the basic task Df peaceful change is not merely 
tO' se cure peace; it is to foster change and achieve peace that secures 
one's basic values. Determining how this goal is to be achieved in specific 
circumstances is the ultimate task of wise and prudent statesmanship (8). 
The third reason why one has to be carefully with use of the term <<peace» 
is that a similar situation could be judged by some as peaceful, bo/ 
others as not SO' peaceful; for the simple reason that they usedifferent 
criteria for assessing a situation. Some' years ago, I dit ."a' stu,dy Df 
diplomatic thinking and asked diplomats from more than 100: ;countries 
what indications they use for assessing the internationalenviromÍlent 
as peaceful (9). AlI the diplO'mats used more than one indicatQr. With 
respect to «absence of violence» as an indicator of peace there was 
overalI consensus; but with respect to other indicators the.re were significant 
di,fferences. Diplomats 'from the industrialize-d countries in the North 
stressed e.g. stability and order as a major indicator; the other hand 
diplomats from developing countries str:ess'ed the absence of structural 
violence or non-interference as indicators of crucial importance. Somewhat 
parodoxical1y one could conc1ude that striving towards peace is frequently the 
cause of conflicts and wars. In the same way wars could be seen as a confron-
tation of two different peace concepts. 
Let us now turn to the second cluster of variables that influence 
the conflict-dynamic; namely the structure of opportunities and constraints 
with ,,:'Which, the decisiO'n-makers are confronted. 
(11) Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, 1983, Cambridge University Press, 
p.209. 
(') Luc Reycheler, Patterns of diplomatic thinking, Praeger. New York, 1979. 
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B~· Oppórtunitystructure 
Game theory has convinci~gly indicates that behavior is not only 
a . function of the nature .of the c.onflict and conflict-parties, but als.o 
of the: context within which conflicts are situated. In a prisoners dilemma 
environment one will find it ralional not tq cooperate, in the other han~ 
in .a,. ,chicken-game e~vironment c.ooperation. will be considered tob~ 
the .most rationaI policy-option. \;Vith respect .to the ()pportunity-structure, 
let me higlight three principIes. Firstof a~I: 
Power creates opportunities 
On the one hand it is de ar that without conflicts there will, bé 
no war., On he other hand one should be aware that an accumulation 
of weapons creates possibilities' and temptatioilS to use them. A studyof 
IS'Asiannations between 1946 and 1970 found that «sharp increases 
in miiitary assistance tend to change the recipient nation's' internationaI 
behàvior toward increased conflict and decreased cooperative behavior (lO). 
Further, aIthough weapons are generally meant to enhance its own security, 
they tend to diminish the feeling of security"of the 9ther party. This is 
caused by the fact that no weapons are a~soIuteIy deft;nsive; they could 
be used as tool for aggression and thereby threaten the opponent. This 
is a c1ear éase, where the soIution has becoine an additlonaI cause of 
the probIem: The perception of weapons as symptoms of undef1ying 
conflicts is correct, but aIso dangerous; especially when it would lead 
to the coric1usion that one should primarely focus on conflict-control and 
overlook the iinportance of êontrolling arms. 
Power is complex 
The second principIe to be' stressed is that power is a comPIex 
phenomenôn.· Power can be used in many ways: states can atteinpt to 
persuade others to dosomething they might otherwise not do; states may 
seek to use their resources ,to reward .other states for doing what they 
want: states may threaten other states with punishment if they do not 
eU) See Beer, op. cit., p. 288. 
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act in accordance with expressed desires; or they may use directmilitary 
or economic force to try to get a state to behave in accordance with 
the expressed wishes~ Whether a ·státé uses persuasion, rewards, punishment, or 
force to influence the behavior of another state, the effectiveness ultimately 
depends upon its power position. Numcrous attempts have been made 
to measure the power of nations. .Sophisticated measures inc1ude tangibIe 
and intangible components of power and stress that power is ultimately 
based on a subjective perception. A sophisticated measure has e.g. been 
deveIoped by Ray Cline. According. to Cli~e, power can be meas~red 
by adding the value. of tangible values (such as population, territQry, 
economic and military capability) and múlt~plying them by the value 
of ~~:ch intangible elements as c1arity of IJ-aÚópal goals, leadership, a~d 
the wiU to carry out national goals (11). 
pp = (C + E + M) X (S + \V) 
Pp = perceived power 
C = criticaI mass = population + territory· 
E = economic capability 
M = military capability 
·S = strategic purpose 
W = wiU to pursue national strategy 
Figure 2. Ray Cline's conccptual framcwork for mcasuring national powcr. 
Capability is important, but the manner :it' is used is even more 
important. Napoleon introduced neither a new weapon nor a new tactical 
system. A1though he was a tactician of genius, his principIe impact 011 
wariare :was the injection of 11ew and imagina tive ideas in to grand tactics 
and; strategy - the most impQ.rtant of these were his- .conceptsof mass 
and: ma.neuver. An indication of the potencial and, .actual lethality. of 
ideas can ben obtained from the comment of one of hisennemies. 
. . . 
Biücher, who stated ,that NapoIe011'S mere presence in é;l. battle or fcampaign 
was worth at .Ieast. 40 000 men (12). 
(11) Ray Clinc, World P01l'er Trcmls anel U. S. Foreigtl Policy !O~· lhe 1980's: 1980, \Vestvicw 
Press, Boulder, Colorado. . . 
e~ Col. Trevor Dupuy, Tlze c!lloll/fiun of lVeapOIlS anel warfwc. 1 984.·I-Jcro Books, Fairfax,., Virgínia. . . . .. . . .. , '. . ... 
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Power lS; 'contextual ':i, 
The third principIe I wouId like to 'highlight is thatpower is ,contextual. 
The propensity to use violence depends oh' the charactics of the international 
environment in which it could be used. In the present- international system 
which is anarchic and has an Hobbessian moral-political Clima te, the 
use of violence or violent threats are common' éurréncy. ,This is true of 
the world as a whole. There are however parts' that are more peaceIul; 
regions where states do not 'expect their conflicts to 'be resolved by 
meims of violence. Those _ are, ,the so-called pluralistic security communities; 
. ~, . ; {. . . ' 
groups of democratic' cou,ntdes within the Eur~pean or the Atlantic. 
Community. Within such communides military power is not very relevant. 
Here power-hierarchies other than the military, play a role. In the rest 
of the worId however the distribution of military power has still a great 
impact on the chances of peace. Many students of international relations 
have studied the impact of different balances of power and changes 
thereof and of bipolar and multipolar system on the chances of war 
and peace. The conc1usions are frequently contradictory but some general 
lessons can be drawn. A first conc1usion is that ther~ is no structure 
that guarantees peace, the only thing one can" say is . that :some are 
more violence prone than others. Parity e.g. did seem to deter countries from 
becoming involved in violent conflicts, but once involved, it appears that 
the more 'equal the countries are, the more in tens the conflicts are. 
For policy-mak.ers, it depends on what they are willing to risk; the chan'ce 
of deterring hostilities, or the chance of keeping hostilities at a low 
leveI. Certainly these considerations are crucial for large powers contemplating 
to provideaid to smaller powers; 'aid that' could shift the powerlbidance 
among' ,theÍlt, The answer unfortunately is not'~'simple:'-'In addition, the 
findiri,g' that closin:g a power gap is more daIigerou~ ÚÚi.à widening a gap, 
wouÚftCêrÚliri.iy be' another consideration for decikio~-makers contemplating 
aid to a smaller country to make it more equal to its adversaries. So, 
power balances, ;~p.d imbalances make a difference. 
Now what about the number of powers; one, two, threeormore'?";l3ipola-
rity, Úipolarity'art'd 'muItipolarity, consistently showed greater adhesion to war 
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variables than unipolari~y (13),.A number of statistical s~udies seem to jndicate 
that the chances of. war in.a :~ipolar world are lower, but if they occllr 
they are likely to be very danger~us and have far: reaching consequences. 
The opposite. is expected in a multipolar system. Theprobability war. is 
higher, but the. consequences lower (14). In summary, one could say that 
the structure of the international systems and shifts thereof are critically 
important determinants of the behavior of states. The structure of the 
intemational system constrains behavior and imposes costs on any behavior 
that. seeks to change the international status-quo. Similarly ·any redistribution 
of interstate capabilities may decrease or~ncrease the costs of changing 
the international system. However~ the t~ndencY'of a society to seek changes 
in the international. system is dependent not only on decreased costs but 
also on domestic factors thatinfluence the çapacity and willingness· of 
a society to pIay these. costs. This brings us to the .third set of. explanatory 
vapables, wbich. couId be labelled: the decision-making. 
C. Decision~making 
• I •• 
. The use of violence as a political . optioI1 is not only determined by 
the nature of the conflict and the 'availâbfe powér, but above alI by 
the reality" J)erceived by the rlecision-makets.·· In othêr words, not onIy 
interests and power, but also perceptlons and lnisperce·ptións 'caÍi raise or 
lower the probability ofpeaceor war. Lefmê highlight three major, problems 
which have captured lots of attention in the research community.· . 
Forecasting difficulties 
The first one concerns the problem of forecasting. Many forecasts 
have been wrong; some with happy consequences, some with disastrous 
consequences. Two decades ago, the. British scientistand noveIist iC, P. 
Snow I>r~dict~d : nuclear war' within a decade as a «mathematicaI 
éértainty» (15). 'Luckily he was wrong. However, a lot of the predictions 
eS) Michael P. Sullivan, lnternational Relatiolls: Theories and Evidence, 1976, Prentice HaU, 
Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N. J., p. 196. 
e4) See Beer, op. cit., p. 196. 
(13) G. Allison, et. aI., Hawks, Doves, and Owls, 1985, W. W. Norton andCompany, Ncw 
York, p. 207. 
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have scored disastrous consequences. The statesmen 'at; the beginning of 
the century had no memory of any previous general war except some 
of them remembered the Franco-Prussian War, which had been resolved 
in six weeks. This made them morereceptive to war as a possibility 
in the summer of 1914. The general Jjopulace moreover, was likely to 
succeed because war was consid"ered interesting a kind of summer sport 
that one might follow in the dai1y papers, while supporting the home 
team. 
An interesting study made by Stoessinger titled «Why nations go to 
war» reveals as the most important precipitating factor in the outbreak 
of 'war, a misperception of the adversary's power (16). 
It is vital to remernber that it is not the actual distribution of 
power' .that precipitates war; but the way in wich a leader thinks that 
power '"i~ distributed. Stoessinger stares «A war will start when nations 
disagree over their perceived strength, and that war will end when the 
fighting nations perceive each other's strength more realisticaIly. Such 
misperceptions contributed to the first world war, to Hitler's attack on 
Russia, to' MacArthur's advance through North Korea toward the Chinese 
border, to America's failure. in Vietnam, to the Arab invasion in Israel 
in 1948, etc. In other, wo~d~ . \VéUS frequently start as a consequence of 
wrong co~t -:- benefit an~lyse.s., The estimation' ofcoqsequences is of 
course veq difficult and consequentially such estimates contain a great 
deal of. su1;>jectivity. But the preference should still go to estimations 
made by people with experience, whose «subjective probability estimate» 
tend to less inaccurate than the ones made by dilettants. 
Crises should be prevented 
" A second area of problems which captured the attention of a major 
group of decision-making analysts are intemational crises and their impact 
on the decision-making quality. The term crisis refers to unanticipated 
situations where a lot is at stake, and where the decision-maker has not 
much time to make a decision. Despite th"e fact that the Chinese have 
ell) J. Stoessinger, Why Nations 80 to War, (second edition), 1978, St. Martin's Press, 
New York. 
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two characters for crisis: one c<?nijqting:~ap.ger and the other,opportunity, 
dang~r se~ to be the predominant; charasteristic of crisis. Ole Holsti, e.g. 
has shown that the stress on 'poUcy: .. ~~kers resulting from an overload 
of communication and strong tim.e .. pressure, as well as anxiety, threat 
and fatigue,: t~~ds to reduce sh~rp~y the number of· alternatives that 
could beseriously considered. He· alsofund· .that under these conditions 
policy-makers tend to single out threats from the flood of incoming 
communications and pay less attention to 'offérs of ,IiegOtiations, conciliating 
messages and the like (17). " 
These. and others nefarious' infIuences .h~ve accentu,ated. the importance 
of crisis management techniques. This: brings us to the third problem 
area: ,the relation betwéen tommunication and' conflict. 
Need for continuous com m unicatidiis-
Since the outcome of decisions are co-determined by the other involved 
: parties continuous communication is of greaf hnportance: John Burton e.g~ 
,stresses the need for more effective communication between the represent 
"iatives of ~ the ,c~nfliêtiiig;' pa;rti}1s,. (18)., ,lJy::effêêtive·cóirirriüniditio.n" 'is' meant 
the deliberate conveying and accurate receipt and interpretation of what 
was intended to be conveyed. Communication ·makes·: enipathy : possible, 
and therefore a requireJllentJor' a more sofisticated kind ofrealism. 
After this short; ;~urvey of those,. three groups of factors determin,ng 
conflict behavior;;;9<?nfliqts; .;opp~)l~tl.}.njty. ,,struçtures ,an4 decision,· making, 
let me, now ntove to(!~tlle~hjrd., cQntn1>u:ti.on.a :scientist can make t,Q 
the security and ,d~f~nse debat~i '.I}~mely, thrQugh his prescriptivc, diagnose~. 
\ ~ I 
'. -~! {,' 
The scientist can help to distinguish ~he different methods for conflict 
management; if possible design new ones;; ~in'«(assesstheir respective pros 
and cons limits and ,possibilities. 
.. . . ~.' : ~ . .: 
, . C7) Richard Smoke, War: Controlling Escalation, 1977, Harvard l)niversity Pr~~~, Ç~mbridge, 
Mass., p. 285~' , ." '", ' ,', , ' " ' " , 
e~ John Burton, Conflict and Communications, 1969, Macm.i:llan, Lo~don. 
91 
NAÇÃO E DEFESA 
In order· to manage conflicts effectively one has to work at the 
same time on each of the earlier; discússed detenninants, this nieans: 
- conflict requires conflict-control:-
- opportunity structure requires opportunity structure controI 
- and decision-making requires decision-making controI. 
CONFLICT-CONTROL I .. L....---------'~ ,.--------. 
·OPPORTUNITY 
STRUCTURE 
DECISION 
MAKING 
~ÇONTROL 
-CONTROL 
PEACEFUL 
CONFLICT 
MANAGEMENT 
Figure 3. Clusters variables for peacefúl Íl1terriational conflict-rriàrtagement. 
A. Conflict control 
As previously stressed, a good conflict dossier is a conditio sine qua 
non for an effective controI of conflicts. In addition to that one should 
be . acquainted with the manifold techniques of regulating conflict. An 
interesting contribution to negotiátion· is e.g. Roger Fisher's Iatest ·book 
titled «Getting to yes: negotiating ágreement~ whithout giving 'ir}» (19). 
In it the author stresses (1) to separate the people from, the probIern; 
(2) to focus on interest and not on positions; (3) the need to invent 
options for mutuaI gain; (4) and the importance of using objective criteria. 
B. Opportunity structure control 
In addition to coping with conflicts, one 'should also spend a great 
deal of energy on controlling the opportunity structure. Such rneasures 
. ('~' Roger Fisher & William Ury, Getting to yes: Negotiating Agreement without givii1g in, 
1983, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth. 
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could be of a political-diplomatic, economic, moral, legal, or military' 
nature. Let me limit' my attention' to measutes, effecting the military 
environment: specifically armscontrol. The aim of armscontrol is generally 
considered threefold: (I) to reduce'the risks 'of war; (2) to limit the damage 
if war breaksout; (3) to reduce the costs of security. To realise those 
goals one can distinguish many methods which can be classified by the 
~tage at wich' they are meant to work; which leads us to four stages (20). 
Four kinds of armscontrol 
1. Arms control at the stage of the development of specific weapons 
or forces. 
Numerous forms of armscontrol are intended to bar or inhibit the 
development of weapons and armed forces. There is e.g. the much debated 
ABM thereaty, which bans the development and testing of various hypo-
thetical anti-ballistic missile systems. This threaty should,' I tl;link, not 
be dropped, but renegotiated, or in order to dose its many loopholes, 
or to develop an agreed upon partial defense system e.g. to defend the 
countries involved against accidentaIor unauthorised launchings. An anti-
-sateIlite treaty could also be situated at this leveI.. 
2. Armscontrol at the stage of deployment. 
Once arms anel forc~s have been developed there are numerous 
forms of restraint that have been adopted or shollld be realized. 
Limits may be placed' on numbers,' sizé and types of specific weapo~ . 
systetns, such as those proposed in the s1 AR T negotiations or in the 
Geneva Summit. In addition there can bé geografic limits on deployment, 
such as those embodied in the Outer Space treaty or the various MBFR 
proposaIs. Limits can also be placed on the distribution . of weapons and 
weapons related technologies to other states, as already practiced with 
(~ This classification is barrowed from Patrick Morgan, Arms Control in Intemational 
Politics, Center for International and Strategic Affairs, Working Paper, n.O 48, 1985, University of 
California, Los Angeles. 
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nuclear weapons. With respect, to the: Nucb:ar, Nqn-proliferation Treaty 
one could explore sanctionsagainst proliferators., To this end, the ,l.Jllited 
States could explore with ,others, induding; the Soviet Union,. 'a, "pIan 
for imposing ,agreed upon polítical, econo~ic and security, sanctions on 
countries that violate non .. proliferatiçm comrnitments or otherwise acquire 
nuclear 'explosives (21). AIso rele.vaJ1,tat this stage of armscontrol are 
certain kinds oí confidence building measures whiçh e.g. limit on the 
size or frequency of maneuvers or which limit offensive deployments. 
Finally, this category also indudes unilateral or multilateral efforts to 
prevent accidental or unauthorized use of weapons and forces. Actions 
to take coud bea reduction on short .. rang theater nuclear weapons. 
Those weapons pose a real danger ofaccidental use in peacetime and 
especially in the «for of wan>. 
Dite couId also add safety devices and procedures and upgrade warning 
~stems. 
3. Armscontrol at the stage of decision to use force. 
The thi"eat of military resistance or retaliation' is iri itself a means 
of armséontrol.' In other words deterrerice should 'be Perceived as 
a major armscontrol measure, particular by deterrelice based on nu~iCar 
weapons, where the ultimate goal is to never have to use them. The 
threat of war and the use of force and war, have ,historicalIy been 
gov~rIled by a fundamental relationship between destructiveness and proba .. 
biiity' 'of war., The m9re pot~ntially destructive a. war seemed to be, 
lqe less the, probability,of 1ts ,~curing, and, vic~, v~rsa. The paci{ist Leo 
ToIstoy appr~ciat~ . thls relationship, and prayed-, 'tll~t ,war~ would become 
sufficientIy destructive sothat men would refuse I to fight, them. With 
this in mind it would be "apprQpriate to maintain,:a. c-redibledeterrent; 
to adopt, a, no first use policy only after having 'obtained' a ,conventional 
deterrent, and to. take measures to- enhance crisisstability.This would 
imply e.g. to take measures to prevent decapitation; and a disapproval 
of accepting a launch on-waming policy or of the developrnent a first 
strike capability. 
(:1) Hawks, Doves, and Owls, op. cit., p. 240 a. o. 
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And ,finally one should not assume that nuclear deterrence will last 
forever. Therefore search for alternatives to deterrence has t9 be intensified. 
4. Armscontrol at the stage where force is used. 
On~e 'military j forces are used, the costs and harmful consequences 
can mount steeply~ . Jand there are several armscontrol measures that can 
be employed at this, ,stage. If a nuclear war ever occurs, a top priority 
will be to stop it. Oneshould e.g. plan for ending a war if it begins; 
developsurvivable US - Soviet communications; and plans for a non-
-early use of nuclear weapons. One should also prepare decision-makers 
to deal with nuclear crises and work with the Soviets to prevent' and 
manage crises. More spedficalIy, the United, States and the Soviet Union 
should seek to create a jointly staffed ~risis-monitoring center along the 
lines proposed by Senators Sam Nunn and John Wamer (22). Among 
its virtues, the fact finding role of 'such a center could provide a useful 
mechanism for introducing a pause early in a crisis. 
Those were some armscontrol measures that would change the 
opportunity-structure "so that the international security would be enhanced. 
Let us now move' to the third area of control;decision-making controlo 
C. Decisioh.;.making' control 
, , ; 
- Limii'misperceptions 
With respect to decision-making I would like to stress the importance 
of limiting misperceptions and the need to invigorate the, ,proliferation 
of democracies. Although no one can predict the future~ the fact is 
that both leaders and the public act on estimations of the trend of events, 
and prognos!!cations frequently beco me self-fulfilllng prophecies. 
It is the17efore prudent to turn to the history of internatiónal relat:ons 
and seek an und~rstanding of the dynamics of world politics fo~ guidance. 
It is important to appreciate the dangers, as well as the opportunities of 
the present momento Dispassionate analysis in an era of rapid change 
is a must to help avoid most wars. 
(~ Hawks, Doves emd Owls, op. cit., p. 237. 
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Another impO-rtànt: way-,to limit misperceptions, is the .organisation 
of' regular meetings ~ with Soviet leaders~Regular discussions between Ame~ 
rican and Soviet officiaIs at the summit, cabinet, high military, and 
working leveIs could considerabIyenhance the mutual understanding of 
h·ow·· each si de sees· its own interests, the others and the risks. If such 
meetings are held at regular intervals, they wouId .become routine, thus 
reducing political .. preassure for tangibIe results from each session. One 
should also avoid treating nuclear weapons like other weapons;or exaggetate 
nrllitary unbalances, and certainly never cut of communications as a 
sanction (23). 
lnvigorate a proliferation of democracies 
Thesecond aim to pursue with respect to: decision-making control 
is to stimulate the proliferation of democratic. regimes in the .worId. 
Less than a third of. alI. countries have. free democratic, regimes; the 
roajority of nations live under . militar,Y authoritarian, or totalitarian 
gov~rnments. This has serious .implications forpeaceful conflict resolution. 
There· has· been rese~h that indica~es that representative governments 
are Iess likeIy to fight one another, and, in the past two centuries, they 
were more likeIy to produce Iong periods ofp~_aç~ (2~). The expansion 
of representative governments in fact, as well iA' fô~, tv6uId also ellhance 
the chances of enlarging the present pIuralistic securitycommunities and also 
of the detente processo 
EXTERNAL INTERNAL 
I',DETENTE' . . +--------..,.... DETENTE .. 
. Fi~re 4. Complex iriterdependency internál~' anti;, extemal'detêiite~: . 
In. this coritextit is important to stressthé!COttipIexity<of the inter~.· 
action between' internaI and e:x:ternal detente. '. I. , .'. 
,,: Cont'radictory to many" expectations,'externaI detente'.does not always 
result in internaI detente. 
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As external detente. inereas~s,. p~essure for internaI free<tom and 
decentralisation; a. situation whieh makes. most undemoeratie govemments 
n«rvous; and forces then to take aetions which have a negative impact 
or externaI detente. In addition totalitarian of authritarian states have 
the propensity to use more readily enemy-images, as a c1assic tool to 
legitimize the int~rnal want. of freedom. The so-called. great '. feeling. of 
insecurity of the $Qyi~tUnion is 'fiot only caus,e(tJ~y, the·: trauInl:itic 
war experiences whieh re~ulted., the .I08s of 2.0·. million ~Jives . but .. also by 
the primordial importanee of its state-secudty. The revQlutionof 1917, 
th~, purges of the twenties and the collectivisation programs under 
Stalin, requested the lives of approximate1y. 11 to 15 million citizens. 
Real progress in int~rnational security is therefore only possible when 
parallel efforts are being made at the leveI of externaI and in.ternal 
detente. 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
At the beginning of my speeeh I stated that in many plaees 
in Europe, the discussion about seeurity and defense became polarized 
and that the general eonsensus deteriorated. The critique side focusses 
not so mueh on the interests to be secured, but on the way those 
interests are being secured. I believe that Europe in terms of security 
is at a turning point. Many factors, externaI and internaI, wiIl force 
Europe to take a greater responsibility for its own s'eeurity. The Amerieans, 
not on1y the conservatives, but also the liberaIs continue to insit on a 
more equitable burden sharing. Th'e Soviets are doing their best to split 
not only the Americans apart from their European allies, but a1so to 
drive a wedge between the Prench and British and their non nuclear 
neighbours in Europe. 
In addition to externaI factors, there are aIso internaI ones, of a 
strategic eeonomic and politicaI nature. A better integrated European 
defense wouId 'enhance the eredibility of its defense; make the European 
security more cost 'effective, and 'make it easier for the European citizens 
to identify with their defense. To deveIop a better European security 
policy, we need to create a dimate, or a forum, where the future of 
Europe can be diseussed in, with an open-mind and 00 an inform'ed 
basis. 
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In this short time span I have highlighted some contributions researchers 
em maIre. It is an irony howéver 80 great as to border on absurdity 
that the Westem European' allies alone spe·nd on a yearly basis, nearly 
100 hillion dolIars on security and defense, and that scientific research 
about how we coud enhance our security at less risks and in a more 
cost-effective way, has been pursued by only a handfuI of specialists, 
spending by comparison, or mere pittance. A greater effort should be 
made to stengthen such research, and here small countries would·certainly 
play a major role. 
Adlai Stevenson once stated that «pOwer corrupts but lack of power 
corrupts absolutely». In many cases I think it's true; a feeling of power-
lessness: can lead to apathy; but it needs not to be like that. Small powers 
arelimited in terrns of their material contribution to the Atlantic and 
European security, but they could play a major role in the search and 
re-search of better security and defense altematives . 
. Luc Reychler . 
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